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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

]
) APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellee,
• •

j

>
]>

VIDAR KILICER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Dist. Ct. No. 041904765
Ct. App. No. 20050406-CA

)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court obtains statutory jurisdiction over this felony conviction pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended).
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Issue
The sole issue in this appeal is whether a motion to withdraw guilty pleas by a noncitizen defendant may constitutionally - under the due process and equal protection clausesbe deemed "untimely" when filed within a reasonable time frame of sentencing/judgment
(as opposed to before sentence is pronounced as required by § 77-13-6(2)(b))5 even when
it was factually impossible for the non-citizen defendant to discern trial counsel's
ineffectiveness or the involuntariness of the pleas until after sentencing and judgment is
pronounced and the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") files a notice of detainer
indicating commencement of removal proceedings against the non-citizen, and where the

-l-

non-citizen is foreclosed by law from presenting the voluntariness or ineffectiveness issue
to any forum because of inability to appear "in person" in a post-conviction proceeding as
a result of expeditious transfer to another state or removal from the United States by DHS.
J?.

Preservation of Issues and Propriety of Review
The issue raised here was properly preserved below. See R. 73, n.3, and R. 98, n. 1.

Further, the district court ruled on the issues presented in the motion to withdraw pleas,
including the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntariness
of defendant's pleas. See R. 100-102; cf, e.g., Draper City v. Roper, 2003 UT App. 631,
Tf 4, 78 P.3d 361. Accordingly, review is proper in this Court. Further, even if not properly
preserved in the court below, as trial counsel could not have preserved his own
ineffectiveness for appellate review, see State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 n.3 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), this Court should nonetheless review the
issues raised because of the significant constitutional implications. In the alternative, this
Court should apply the "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" doctrine to failure to
preserve the issues. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d); Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35 & nn.7-12; State
v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
C.

Standard of Appellate Review
1.

The standard of review is whether the district court strictly complied with

constitutional and procedural requirements in taking guilty pleas, and is thus a question of
law reviewed for correctness. State v. Smit, 95 P.3d 1203, 2004 UT App. 222, ^f 7; State v.

-2-

Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 202; State v. Visser, 2001 UT App. 215, 31 P.3d 584. The
denial of a motion to withdraw guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which
standard incorporates the clearly erroneous standard in the factual findings sought to be
reviewed. Smit, supra. Ultimately, whether a district court's ruling is constitutionally sound
is a question of law reviewed de novo. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995).
2. A plain error analysis requires this Court to view the trial record as a whole to
determine if the claim errors seriously affected the fairness of the trial and thus review is for
correctness. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Eldredge, 113
P.2d 29, 35 & nn.7-12 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v.
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App. 186, % 6 5 P.3d 1222.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to resolving
this case, the relevant portions of which are reproduced verbatim in Addendum E:
United States Constitution, Amendment V;
United States Constitution, Amendment VI;
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV;
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12;
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 24;
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 etseq. (2004);

-3-

Utah R. Civ. Pro. 65C(k)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case
On May 27, 2003, Defendant and two others allegedly conspired to rob a Pizza Hut

and then stole items worth of over $5,000 from the store. See R.l-3, 112, at p.3. On
November 19, 2004, Defendant entered guilty pleas in the District Court to Burglary, a
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, a third degree felony, and Theft, a violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404, a third degree felony. R.l 12, at p.4.1
B.

Course Of Proceeding and Disposition
There were no pre-trial motions of significance filed by the parties. After entering the

guilty pleas, the district court sentenced defendant on March 4, 2005, to two indeterminate
prison terms of zero to five years; however, the sentences were suspended in lieu of
probation and thirty days in jail. R. 66-69.2 Thereafter, or about April 8, 2005, Defendant
filed a motion to withdraw guilty pleas claiming counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
misadvising him of the immigration consequences of the pleas, and because his pleas were
involuntarily obtained. See R. 98-99.

On April 14, 2005, the District Court denied

1

Defendant's guilty pleas may not have veen knowing and voluntary in light of his
refusal to acknowledge that he entrered the store with intent to commit a theft. See R. 112,
at p.3. Mr. Steven McCaughey, attorney at law, was of significant help in this brief.
2

Although not currently incarcerated by the state of Utah, Defendant is in the custody
of the United States Department of Homeland Security in Eloy, Arizona, as a result of the
conviction and sentence. See Addendum C.
-4-

Defendant's motion to withdraw guilty pleas. R. 100-102; Addendum A. An appeal ensued
to this Court on April 27, 2005. R.103-104. On July 5, 2005, this Court withdrew its sua
sponte motion for summary disposition. See Addendum D.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant is a 20-year old native and citizen of Turkey, who entered the United
States with his father at age 8. He attended elementary through high schools in the United
States - in California, and finally graduated from Cottonwood High School in Salt Lake
City, Utah. He is a lawful permanent resident alien ("LPR") who acquired that status in
2004 as a ward of the State of Utah through DCFS, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J),
after having demonstrated that his parents had abandoned him at the lonely age of 12. See
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
Defendant desires to join the United States Marines, as he is fluent in Turkish and English
languages. R.71-72.
The State alleges that on May 27, 2003, Defendant and two others robbed a Pizza
Hut and stole items worth of over $5,000. See R.l-3, 112, at p.3. On November 19, 2004,
Defendant entered guilty pleas to Burglary and Theft, both third degree felonies. R. 112, at
p.4. The convictions entered against Defendant, without a doubt, render him deportable to
Turkey as an "aggravated felon" to which there is no relief from deportation. R.72; see also
INA §§ 237(a)(2)(a)(iii) & 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) & 1101(a)(43)(G);
State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App. 203, 73 P.3d 967 (discussing ramifications of an
"aggravated felony" conviction), cert, granted, 80 P.3d 152 (Utah, Dec. 2003); Matter of
-5-

Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506(BIA 1992); J afar v. INS, 77 F.Supp.2d 360, 364-65
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (a sentence to one year term of imprisonment for petit larceny, while a
misdemeanor under state law, is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes). See also,
e.g., INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (which also renders defendant
deportable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude ["CIMTs"]
within five years of becoming an LPR).
On or about March 4, 2005, the District Court sentenced Defendant to two
indeterminate prison terms of zero to five years; however, the sentences were suspended in
lieu of probation and thirty days in jail. R. 66-69. Defendant is currently detained by DHS
in Eloy, Arizona. In fact, on July 15, 2005, an immigration judge ordered Defendant
removed to Turkey as an "aggravated felon." See Addendum C. Defendant is also subject
to other harsh penalties as an aggravated felon should he illegally re-enter the United States
after deportation. See id; see also INA § 276(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
Subsequent to sentencing, Defendant filed with the District Court a motion to
withdraw guilty pleas on or about April 4, 2005, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6
(1953, as amended). See R.98-99. On April 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to
withdraw the pleas as untimely. R. 101-102. This appeal then followed. R. 103-104.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court held in Rojas-Martinez that a non-citizen defendant is entitled to
affirmative, sound legal advise regarding the immigration consequences of pleading guilty

-6-

to a crime. Trial counsel in this case misadvised Defendant - a lawful permanent resident
alien - regarding the immigration consequences of the pleas to two "aggravated felony"
crimes which have now resulted in an immigration judge ordering Defendant removed from
the United States to Turkey. However, Defendant, like most non-citizens charged with a
crime, was unable to (and could not have) discern counsel's ineffectiveness until he was
placed in removal proceedings by DHS. Upon finding out trial counsel's error, Defendant
immediately moved to withdraw his guilty pleas because of counsel's ineffectiveness and
the involuntariness of the pleas.
Mechanically applying the rule that a motion to withdraw a plea must be filed before
sentencing, the District Court denied defendant's motion as untimely and thus, in essence,
thrust defendant into a post-conviction habeas corpus petition as the only other means to
challenge the voluntariness of his pleas. By denying the motion to withdraw pleas, the
district court abused discretion and committed reversible error because it failed to consider
that Defendant is forever foreclosed from seeking to withdraw his pleas because he has been
transferred out of the state of Utah and would therefore be unable to be present "in person"
for dispositive hearings as required by the rules governing post-conviction petitions.
Because the district court's decision essentially fails the test recently enunciated by
the Utah Supreme Court in Merrill - that a due process and equal protection violations
occurs whenever a defendant is foreclosed from presenting issues relating to involuntariness
of a plea to any forum - the district court must be reversed and the matter remanded for a

-7-

hearing on the motion to withdraw pleas to determine if counsel's advice to Defendant on
the immigration consequences of the pleas satisfies the Rojas-Martinez test.
In remanding the matter, this Court need not find facially unconstitutional § 77-136(2)(b), the enabling statute governing motions to withdraw a guilty plea. Rather, the Court
will be harmonizing § 77-13-6, consistent with the due process and equal protection
mandates of Merrill, with the procedural rules governing post-conviction petitions - Rule
65C(k) - as requiring that a non-citizen defendant who has been ordered deported or exiled
to another state by DHS must be allowed to withdraw a plea upon promptly filing such a
motion when counsel's ineffectiveness is discovered. Such a reasonable time frame need
not exceed ninety days, sufficient to allow the non-citizen to explore his options, seek
counsel, and file a motion to withdraw plea. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the
dictates of Merrill, and would render meaningless the core holding by this Court in RojasMartinez that a guilty plea is infirm if counsel failed to properly advise a non-citizen of the
immigration consequences of a plea.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED AS
UNTIMELY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEAS FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD OF
SENTENCING AND UPON DISCOVERING TRIAL COUNSEL'S
INEFFECTIVENESS IN MISADVISING HIM OF THE
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEAS,
PARTICULARLY WHERE NO OTHER FORUM EXISTS FOR
THE NON-CITIZEN DEFENDANT TO RAISE QUESTIONS
-8-

RELATING TO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS PLEAS OR
COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS.
A. This Court and the United States Supreme Court have determined that
non-citizen defendants must be correctly advised of immigration consequences of
guilty pleas lest the pleas be found involuntary or counsel ineffective.
The issues before the Court is of significant due process and equal protection
importance. See,e.g., State v. Rojas, 2003 UT App. 203 (holding that defense counsel
must correctly advice non-citizens of deportation consequences of guilty pleas); State v.
Merrill, 2005 UT 34,114 P.3d 585, 2005 WL 1367368 (Utah, June 10, 2005) (noting that
due process is violated when a class of defendants are deprived of a forum to assert
defects in their guilty pleas).
Against the backdrop of fervent congressional activities in criminal-immigration
law, the United States Supreme Court in 2001 ruled on whether Congress in AEDPA3
could retroactively bar deportation relief to LPRs who pleaded guilty to certain
deportable offenses prior to the advent of the new immigration laws. In INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (2001),4 the Supreme Court discussed at length the
importance of an informed plea discussion between non-citizen criminal defendants, their

3

Anti-Terroirsm and Effectcive Death Penalty Act, Publ L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (April 24,1996).
4

For a thorough analysis of the St. Cyr decision, see Ishola, INS v. St. Cyr: The
Supreme Court and Draconian Congressional Criminal-Immigration Laws, 14 Utah Bar
Journal 9 (Dec. 2001).
-9-

attorneys, and the prosecution.5 The Supreme Court recognized that the nature and
timing of plea agreements are very critical in determining whether a non-citizen who has
committed a crime is deported or remains in the United States. See id. The St. Cyr Court
finally laid to rest and rejected the argument that deportation is "prospective" or
"collateral" and, as the argument further goes, whether an alien was not advised or
misadvised of the immigration consequences of a plea does not implicate a guilty plea in
a criminal proceeding:
The INS argues that deportation proceedings (and the Attorney General's
discretionary power to grant relief from deportation) are "inherently
prospective" and that, as a result, application of the law of deportation can
never have a retroactive effect. Such categorical arguments are not
particularly helpful. . . .

St Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324, 121 S.Ct. at 2292. The Court then discussed the importance of
an effectively-counseled plea agreement between a non-citizen, the defense counsel, and
the government:
Plea agreements involved quid pro quo between a criminal defendant and
the government. See Newton v. Pumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393, n.3, 107 S.Ct.
1187, 94 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987). In exchange for perceived benefits,
defendants waive several of their constitutional rights (including the right
to a trial) and grant the government numerous "tangible benefits, such as
promptly imposed punishment without the expenditure of prosecutorial
resources." Id,
Id., 533 U.S. at 322-323, 121 S.Ct. at 2291. The Supreme Court then reiterated the

5

See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323, n. 48 (chronicling how the States have responded to
dealing with the criminal aliens and guilty pleas).
-10-

importance of effective assistance of counsel at this stage of criminal proceedings,
quoting with approval that "if a defendant will face deportation as a result of the
conviction defense counsel should fully advise the defendant of these consequences."
Id. at 323, n.51 (Citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 14-3.2 Comment, 75 (2d ed.
1982) (emphasis supplied)).
The foregoing lengthy discussion in St. Cyr of the importance of a plea agreement
between non-citizen criminal defendants, their attorneys, and the prosecution is a
recognition by the Court that, with the advent of IIRIRA6 the nature and timing of plea
agreements become highly critical in determining whether a non-citizen who has
committed a crime is deported or remains in the United States. Indeed, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that deportation under IIRIRA for an aggravated felon is no
longer an academic exercise, for "[tjhere is a clear difference between facing possible
deportation and facing certain deportation." Id, 533 U.S. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2293. An
"aggravated felon," as stated above, simply does not face deportation; rather, he or she
faces, as the Supreme Court held, certain deportation because of the irrebutable
presumption of deportability. See id.
Furthermore, other appellate courts have recently ruled on the thorny question of
the level of competent advice to be give a non-citizen criminal defendant at the guilty
plea phase. See, e.g., State v. Rojas-Martinez, 73 P.3d 967 (Utah). In In re Resendiz, 25
6

Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009(1996).
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CaUth 230, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d at 445-46, 19 P.3d at 1185,7 a more recent and lengthy
analysis by the California Supreme Court of the role of defense counsel during plea
negotiations with a non-citizen, the court found that counsel's statement that defendant
would have no immigration problems constitutes affirmative misrepresentation. See id.;
see also Gonzalez, 83 P.3d 921, 924-25 (Ore. Ct. App.2004) ("Because the current
immigration scheme all but requires that aliens convicted of aggravated felonies be
deported, we conclude that Petitioner's trial counsel was obligated to tell Petitioner that
he was pleading guilty to an aggravated felony and that, unless the United States
Attorney general or his designee chose not to pursue deportation proceedings against
Petitioner, he would be deported as a result of his guilty plea.").
Defense counsel's statement in the instant case that Defendant "may not" be
deported" as a result of pleading guilty to two aggravated felony offenses is on par with,
and indistinguishable from, counsel's statement in Gonzalez that Petitioner "may" be
subject to deportation. Both statements were patently calculated by counsel to mislead,
and to avoid and deflect responsibility — the responsibility to investigate and research
the nature of the potential conviction, its characterization under federal criminalimmigration law, and its impact on defendants' contemplated plea.
B.

As Applied, the District Court's Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-6(2)(b) as precluding Defendant's motion to withdraw pleas filed

7

Although decided some few months before St. Cyr, Resendiz portends what was
to come in the former, reaching the same doctrinal conclusion on the importance of wellinformed plea bargain between counsel and a non-citizen defendant. See 25 Cal. 4th at 230.
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within a reasonable period after sentencing violates Due Process and
Equal Protection Because There is No Other Forum in Which
Defendant Could Assert the Involuntariness of His Guilty Pleas and
Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel Once He is Exiled by DHS to Arizona
and/or Expeditiously Removed from the United States and thus
Cannot Be "Present" for His Post-Conviction Relief Hearing as
Required by Rule 65C(k).
1. As Applied Due Process Violation
Due Process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed a crime in order to sustain a conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 361-63, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970). Due process also requires that if the defendant does
not hold the State to its requisite burden of proof and instead pleads guilty, it is axiomatic
that the guilty plea itself must be knowingly and voluntarily made. Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969). As the Supreme Court noted in Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938),
A defendant who enters such a plea [a guilty plea] simultaneously waives
several constitutional rights, including his privilege against selfincrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his
accusers. For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must
be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.
Because there are questions regarding whether Defendant's pleas were knowing
and voluntary and whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to apprise
him of the deportation consequences of the pleas, this Court must find that, as applied,
the requirement of § 77-13-6(2)(b) is directory and immediately remand the case to
decide whether Defendant's pleas were voluntary before he is expeditiously removed
-13-

from the United States and loses the right to challenge his conviction under the PostConviction Remedies Act, for he would unable to be "present" at his hearing as required
by Rule 65C(k). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101; Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(k). The court
in Johnson provides further guidance on the due process of law required for guilty pleas,
stating,
[I]f a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has
been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover,
because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal
criminal charge, it cannot truly be voluntary unless the defendant possesses
an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.
Id. at 466; see also Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) (referring to due
process in a criminal proceeding as a fundamental right); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S.
329, 334, 61 S.Ct. 572 (1941) (noting that a plea cannot be voluntary unless the
defendant received "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and
most universally recognized requirement of due process.").
As further elucidated below, non-citizen defendants, like Defendant, do not have a
means by which they can re-appear before the trial court and have these due process
rights enforced if they do not file a motion to withdraw their pleas immediately upon
discovering counsel's ineffectiveness and commencement of removal proceedings, and
are immediately deported from the United States pursuant to federal immigration laws.
See INA §§ 237, 238, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1228 (mandating expeditious removal of
aggravated felons). Thus, interpretation by the district court of § 77-13-6(2)(b), which
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the court found as barring her from hearing the "untimely" motion to withdraw pleas for
this non-citizen Defendant, violates due process since the court has not determined
whether the plea was knowing and voluntary.
2. Equal Protection Violation
In addition, the district court's interpretation of § 77-13-6(2)(b) violates equal
protection and uniform operation of laws by differentiating between defendants who can
withdraw their illegally-obtained pleas based solely on the time at which the defendant
files a motion to withdraw. The Equal Protection clause provides protection to all
persons similarly situated. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 24.
When legislation creates classifications that impinge upon a fundamental interest, the
statute is upheld only if it furthers a compelling state interest. See State in the Interest of
MR., 967 P.2d 951, 953-54 (Utah App. 1998); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62,
100 S.Ct. 2286 (1980) (strict scrutiny test requires that "the legislation be finely tailored
to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it
draws must be carefully scrutinized"); Mohi, 901 P.2d at 995 (statute must be reasonable
in relation to state's need to enact it).
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution similarly requires that all laws have
uniform operation. See Utah Const, art. I, § 24. At least in the context of economic
legislation, this constitutional protection is as rigorous as the protection provided by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). The
Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the tests of "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis"
are not helpful in assessing whether legislation violates the uniform operations of the law
provision. See Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc±, 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995).
Rather than employing strict scrutiny or rational basis tests, the analysis for determining
whether a statute violates Article I, section 24 is "(1) whether the classification is
reasonable, (2) whether the legislative objectives are legitimate, and (3) whether there is
a reasonable relationship between the two." Id. at 426 (citing Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at
637).
The right in a criminal case to have the state prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt and the concomitant due process right to be convicted of a crime based on a plea *
of guilty only when the plea is knowingly and voluntarily made, are of fundamental
importance. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 254 (referring to deprivation of due process in a
criminal proceeding as a fundamental right); Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, *f20, 5 P.3d
616 ("A just and peaceful society must secure by law the fundamental rights of all its
citizens"; these fundamental rights include criminal law sanctions); accord State v.
Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585, 2005 WL 1367368 (Utah). Moreover, these due
process rights directly implicate the right to liberty and therefore are fundamental. See
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919 (1991) (further citation
omitted) ("Every person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the
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Government may not punish him unless and until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with the relevant constitutional
guarantees."). Because, as applied here, the ruling in the district court directly subjugates
a non-citizen criminal defendant's exercise of his due process rights and liberty interests
to the requirement provided by § 77-13-6(2)(b), the statute is subject to strict judicial
scrutiny under equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc^
903 P.2d at 426.
The State clearly does not have a compelling need to limit the time in which a
non-citizen defendant can move the court to withdraw an illegal plea to before sentence
is pronounced. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the state's interest in
limiting the time in which a defendant can challenge a due process violation is not
significantly compelling to warrant the imposition of a statute of limitations of habeas
petitions. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 254. The Court's statement in Julian that "if the
proper showing is made, the mere passage of time can never justify continued
imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental rights, regardless of how
difficult it may be for the State to re-prosecute the individual" resolves the question of
whether the State has a compelling interest that would justify the classification. Id.
Because the state's interest in reprosecuting the individual in a speedy fashion does not
justify a time limit on claiming a deprivation of fundamental rights, section 77-13-6(2)(b)
violates equal protection.
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Application of Article I, Section 24 uniform operations of the law test also
demonstrates that the district court's interpretation of § 77-13-6(2)(b) is unconstitutional
as applied here. If the requirement to file a motion to withdraw plea under § 77-136(2)(b) were considered jurisdictional, the statute would violate uniform operation of
laws with respect to non-citizen defendants. First, the statute would classify those
defendants who can obtain immediate relief from an unconstitutional plea through a
motion to withdraw and/or post-conviction relief, and those who cannot as a result of
alienage and because of rapid exile or deportation from the United States by DHS.
The classes would be subjected to significantly disparate treatment, not only
because of the passage of time a defendant may spend incarcerated while going the more
circuitous route through appeal and post-conviction proceedings, but also because the
post-conviction statute and its concomitant procedural rule require that the habeas or
post-conviction petitioner be "present" all hearings on dispositive motions. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-101; Rule 65C(k), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition, the legislative objectives are not compelling. There is no reasonable
objective to warrant such disparity between citizen defendants who may file motions to
withdraw pleas and also seek post-conviction relief, and non-citizen defendants who may
not file such a motion or post-conviction petition because of expedited removal
proceedings and state procedural law mandating their presence on all dispositive motions
when, in all reality, such non-citizens shall remain in the custody of DHS throughout
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removal proceedings until they are ordered deported by an immigration judge. See INA
§ 236©), 8 U.S.C. § 1226©); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (2003)
(finding that mandatory detention of non-citizens in "civil" immigration proceedings
does not violate due process).
Again, while the Supreme Court has acknowledged the state's concerns about the
increased difficulty in prosecuting a case after time has elapsed, it has specifically
rejected the notion that such increased difficulties establish an adequate basis for
depriving an individual of fundamental rights based solely on the passage of time. See
Julian, 966 P.2d at 254. In this particular case, the requirement that a motion to
withdraw a plea be filed prior to sentencing by a non-citizen defendant unaware of
counsel's ineffectiveness until removal proceedings are commenced is acutely unfair and
deprives the non-citizen defendant of fundamental rights simply because of alienage, as
he could be exiled or deported before commencement of a lengthy post-conviction relief
petition. Further, because the post-conviction law requires that the petitioner be present
in court on dispositive motion, the State has by all means foreclose all avenues in which
a non-citizen defendant in removal proceedings may seek to challenge the voluntariness
of his guilty plea or allege counsel's ineffectiveness.
Defendant reiterates that he raises no wholesale, facial constitutional challenge to
§ 77-13-6. Axiomatically, whenever possible, a statute must be interpreted so as not to
conflict with constitutional requirements. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1009. The
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district court's interpretation of § 77-13-6(2)(b) violates due process and equal protection
for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, that interpretation should be rejected and this
Court should hold that the requirement that a motion to withdraw pleas as provided by §
77-13-6(2)(b) is directory only and in no way creates a jurisdictional bar to a trial court
hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for a non-citizen defendant who, as this Court
found in Rojas-Martinez, is entitled to sound legal advise on the immigration
implications of a guilty plea, who is usually unaware and thus unable to assert that right
until DHS commences removal proceedings, and who may forever be barred from
asserting the right in any forum because of exile to another state or expedited removal
from the United States by DHS, and thus cannot be "present" in PCRA proceedings as
required by Rule 65C(k).
The same concerns that led the Supreme Court to reject the statute of limitations
in habeas cases apply in the instant case. Precluding a trial court from hearing a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea entered in that court "remove[s] flexibility and discretion from
state judicial procedure, thereby diminishing the court's ability to guarantee fairness and
equity in particular cases." Julian, 966 P.2d at 253 (citation omitted). Just as the writ of
habeas corpus provides an essential protection of fundamental rights and offers a remedy
for violations of due process, a trial court's authority to withdraw an unconstitutional
plea, particularly when the request is made within 90 days or a reasonable period after
sentencing, protects fundamental rights by providing a remedy for violations of due
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process that occur in taking pleas. Phrased differently, allowing a trial judge to hear a
meritorious motion to withdraw a plea when the motion is filed within 90 days of
sentencing allows the judicial branch to fulfill its role as a distinct and separate branch of
government and its duty to fairly and equitably administer justice.
Most importantly, when a plea is taken in direct violation of due process, a
defendant has been wrongfully incarcerated and any failure to re-examine the conviction
would be unconscionable. Id. at 253. Since "the mere passage of time can never justify
continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental rights" (id.), a
non-citizen defendants must be given some access to the courts in order to challenge his
convictions obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
3. Recent Utah supreme court decision supports Defendant's position
Admittedly, just a few months ago, in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585,
2005 WL 1367368, rebuffing a due process challenge to the thirty-day limitations period
in former § 77-13-6,8 the Utah supreme court found that the statute is jurisdictional and
facially constitutional. However, the Court stated that "[w]hile an unknowing or
involuntary guilty plea is likely to constitute a denial of due process, an absolute
prohibition against providing a forum to a defendant in which he may assert defects in
his guilty plea would certainly violate due process guarantees" Id., ff 8-9, 114 P.3d at

8

Section 77-13-6 has been significantly amended since Merrill For the purposes
of the instant case, the statute now requires a motion to be filed prior to sentencing, as
opposed to within thirty days of entering a plea. See UCA § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2005).
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592, 2005 WL 1367368, at * 6 (emphasis added).
With respect to the equal protection challenge, the Supreme Court in Merrill also
noted that "some access to the courts for the purpose of reviewing the lawfulness of a
guilty plea is a fundamental right." Id., 113, 14 P.3d at 592, 2005 WL at *9. The Court
goes on to state that members of the class covered by the statute joined the class by
choice:
Section 77-13-6 extends to each of these defendants the opportunity to
obtain relief from the consequences of his plea by filing a motion within
thirty days of a final judgment. No defendant is consigned to the
disadvantaged class merely because he pleaded guilty. Instead, each enjoys
an equal opportunity to avoid whatever disadvantages might attend the
PRCA by moving to withdraw his guilty plea within the thirty-day statutory
period. In this way, the classification created by the statute is conditional
and contingent, and membership in the class is voluntary. It "applies
equally" to all defendants who plead guilty, including those whose guilty
pleas were unlawfully obtained or who, for some other reasons, may be
entitled to withdraw their pleas.
Id, Tfl3 (emphasis supplied).
Merrill, as earlier stated, is distinguishable from the instant case in that Merrill
dealt with a citizen defendant who was not subject to deportation and may be "present" at
dispositive PCRA proceedings as required by Rule 65C(k). On the other hand, the
instant case crystalizes the dilemma of a non-citizen criminal defendant attempting to
withdraw a guilty plea, but who was unaware of counsel's ineffectiveness prior to
sentencing and entering of judgment, and who is forever foreclosed from seeking to
withdraw his pleas as a result of expeditious deportation from the United States or, as
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here, one exiled to another state and thus cannot be "present" for PCRA proceedings. It
is axiomatic that most non-citizen defendants are usually unaware of the deportation
consequences of their guilty pleas until DHS files a detainer9 and commences removal
proceedings. See,e.g., United States v. Singh, 305 F.Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004);
Affidavit of Hakeem Ishola, attached as Addendum E [previously attached as Addendum
A to defendant's opposition to sua sponte motion for summary disposition]. Further, it
is a "conviction" as defined by federal immigration laws that triggers removal
proceedings. See INA §101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) ("the term
'conviction' means, with respect to an alien, . . . a judge or jury has found he alien or
guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. . ."); Lujan-Armendariz
v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, the filing of a notice of appeal in an appeal
of right (direct appeal) ordinarily stays a non-citizen's deportation, whereas the filing of a
post-conviction petition - the so-called collateral challenge - as contemplated in PCRA
does not. In other words, an appealed judgment to the first appellate court is not
considered a "conviction" for immigration purposes whereas a post-conviction petition is
given no weight in removal proceedings. See,e.g., Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.
1971); Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Thomas, 21 I. & N. Dec
20, 21 n.l (BIA 1995). The fact that immigration laws render deportable aliens who are
9

"The INS (now DHS) often places a notice with federal or state prison officials
called a "detainer," requesting the Bureau of Prisons or its equivalent to notify INS if they
intend to release the detained alien or hold the alien for INS. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 287.7.
Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook 216 (8th ed. 2002).
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collaterally attacking their convictions in a habeas petition but not those who have filed
direct appeals of their convictions is further indicative of the need to allow non-citizens
who have been erroneously convicted to withdraw their pleas upon promptly
demonstrating the involuntariness of the pleas.
In sum, most non-citizen defendants are unaware of the deportation consequences
of their guilty pleas until DHS files a detainer and commences removal proceedings after
a judgment is obtained. This Court has found that counsel may be constitutionally
ineffective and thus guilty pleas involuntary for failure to advise a non-citizen of
deportation consequences of a plea. See Rojas-Martinez, supra. By requiring a noncitizen defendant to move to withdraw his pleas prior to sentencing and prior to being
aware of the possibility of deportation and ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the
amended § 77-13-6 puts the cart before the horse, and impermissibly denies this class of
people due process and equal protection. Therefore, unlike Merrill, Defendant belongs
to a discrete and insular minority class who is deprived of the right to assert defects in
their pleas in any forum. See Merrill, supra.
Phrased differently, Defendant believes that non-citizens defendants, like him, are
denied any forum to challenge the voluntariness of their pleas because the statute now
requires that a guilty plea be withdrawn prior to sentencing (not within "30 days of a
final judgment" as contemplated by Merrill), and the concomitant procedural rules
requiring PCRA petitioners be present clearly forecloses any forum for the non-citizen
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aggravated felon who is either in DHS custody in another state or has been expeditiously
removed from the United States. Therefore, the requirement that a motion to withdraw a
plea be filed before sentencing works particular hardship on a non-citizen criminal
defendant and prevents him from a forum to seek redress as the non-citizen is usually
deported immediately upon entering a plea and being found by the immigration judge to
have been "convicted," and has not filed a direct appeal. See, e.g., Addendum D (IJ
ordering defendant removed to Turkey as a result of two aggravated felony convictions).
Accordingly, because a post-conviction petition may exonerate a citizen and
erases the stigma of conviction, a non-citizen defendant does not enjoy that benefit as he
would have been deported with no opportunity for further relief The difference,
therefore, between the treatment of a citizen and non-citizen under § 77-13-6 and the
PRCA highlights the denial of a uniform operation of the law to the former.
CONCLUSIONS AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the reasons specified above, this Court should reverse the decision of the
district court and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of August, 2005.
ISHOLA LAW FIRM, P.C.
Attorneysfor Defendant- Appellant

HAKEEM ISHOLA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Opening
Brief was mailed by first-class postage prepaid this J v ^ d a y of August, 2005, to:
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Matthew D. Bates
Assistant Attorneys General for the State of Utah
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
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Addendum "A"
Memorandum Decision of the District Court

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
VIDARKILICER,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTE ENTRY and DECISION
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS/WRIT OF
CORAM NOBIS
Case No.: 041904765
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

TJ1
Before the court is Defendant's April 8, 2005 motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. On
November 14, 2004 defendant entered guilty pleas to one count of Burglary, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-202, and to one count of Theft, also a third degree
felony in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-404. On March 4, 2005 defendant was sentenced to two
indeterminate terms of 0-5 years at the state prison. That prison term was stayed and Defendant
was placed on supervised probation through Adult Probation and Parole, subject to his serving
30 days in jail and completing other conditions of probation. Defendant has now completed his
30-day jail term but remains incarcerated at the Summit County Jail as a result of a detainer
lodged by the Department of Homeland Security. Defendant faces removal proceedings as an
"aggravated felon" as a result of these convictions and is now subject to deportation under
applicable laws of the United States. Defendant claims that at the time he plead to these crimes,
he was not aware that the crimes would be grounds for deportation and further that his plea was
the result of misinformation provided by his counsel at his pleading colloquy.
%2
Defendants do not have an unqualified right to withdraw their guilty pleas. Pursuant to
Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(a), a guilty plea may be withdrawn only upon leave of Court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. More importantly for present purposes,
under subsection (2)(b) of that section, "[ajrequest to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made
by motion before sentence is announced." Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2004) (emphasis added).
Following pronouncement of sentence, the Court loses jurisdiction to address plea issues except
for correction of an illegal sentence under Utah R. Grim. P. 22(e). See, e.g., Utah v.
Tarnawiecki, 5 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 2000. The sentence imposed in this case was not
an illegal sentence subject to correction under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). In fact, Utah R. Crim. P.
11(e) expressly provides that "[ujnless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea." *
1

Deportation is a "collateral consequence" of conviction. State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303,
1304-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Although an attorney's failure to advise a defendant of the
possibility of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, icl, an affirmative

f3
Defendant's reliance on State v. Rojas-Martinez, 73 P.3d 967, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)
is misplaced, hi that case, Rojas-Martinez timely filed his motion to withdraw the plea under
then-existing law. However, in 2004 the Utah legislature amended § 77-13-6 to provide
expressly that withdrawals of pleas may be made, if at all, only up to the time of sentencing2
Here, Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea was filed more than a month after he was
sentenced. Under § 77-13-6(2)(c), Defendant's only remedy lies under the Utah Post-Conviction
Remedies Act and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Tf4
Defendant also brings this motion pursuant to a "writ of coram nobis." A writ of coram
nobis seeks review of a judgment on the ground that judgment would not have been rendered but
for mistakes of fact which were unknown to the trial court and the parties. State v. Woodward,
108 Utah 390, 391, 160 P.2d 432,433 (1945). See also Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85; 448
P.2d 907 (Utah 1968). Coram nobis is a limited remedy of narrow scope and is available, where
no other remedy exists, to correct errors of fact, not errors of law. Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d
787 (Utah 1986). As noted in the preceding paragraph, § 7^-13-6(2)(c) expressly provides for a
remedy under Utah law; accordingly, relief by writ of coram nobis is unavailable.3 The motion is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 14th day of April, 2005.

Demse Posse LindJ^gTThird District Court Judge
\

misrepresentation of deportation consequences has been found to be ineffective assistance of
counsel. State v. Rojas-Martinez, 73 P.3d 967, 969 (Utah Ct App. 2003).
2
Except in pleas in abeyance, not at issue here, in which case a defendant must move to
withdraw his plea, if at all, within 30 days from the time he pled guilty.
3
It is unclear whether Utah law still recognizes the writ of coram nobis. According to Black's
law dictionary, this writ was abolished by adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and superseded by
relief provided by that rule. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.).at 304-05. Given that Utah's rules
of civil procedure, including R. 60(b), are modeled on the federal rules, and that all reported
Utah cases discussing this writ predate the adoption of the current rules, it may well be that the
writ is no longer available.
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day of April
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copy of the foregoing notice concerning disposition of funds, postage prepaid thereon, to the
following:

Clark A. Harms
Deputy District Attorney
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Hakeem Ishola
Ishola Law Firm, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
716 East 4500 South, Suite-142
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Addendum "B"
Transcript of Guilty Plea Hearing

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 041904765 FS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellate Case No. 20050406-CA

Plaintiff,

VIDARKILICHER,
Defendant.

CHANGE OF PLEA NOVEMBER 19,2004
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - NOVEMBER 19, 2004

2

JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG PRESIDING

3

For the Plaintiff:

Patricia Parkinson

4

For the Defendant:

John D. O'Connell, Jr •

5
6
7
8
9

THE COURT: And we have Mr. Kilicher set for
disposition.
MS. PARKINSON: Your Honor, if I may approach, I have
an amended information.
THE COURT: All right. And under this amended

10

information that the State has just filed with the court, Mr.

11

Kilicher is charged with one count of theft, a third degree

12

felony, amended down from a first.

13
14
15
16

MR. O'CONNELL: I'm not sure - there's a count theft
and a count burglary.
THE COURT: And a count of burglary.

Sorry, I missed

that, also is a third degree felony.

17

MR. O'CONNELL:

18

THE COURT: And is it Mr. Kilicher's intention to

19

Right.

plead to these matters?

20

MR. O'CONNELL:

21

THE COURT: And has Mr. Kilicher had a chance to

22

That's correct.

review the Statement of Defendant?

23

MR. O'CONNELL: He has.

24

THE COURT: And Mr. Kilicher?

25

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Did you read it personally or have it reao

1
2

to you?

3

THE DEFENDANT: I followed along as he read it to me.

4

THE COURT: Did you understand everything that was

5

covered?

6

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

7

THE COURT: Do you have any remaining questions that ]

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

can answer for you about anything in there?
THE DEFENDANT: The only question I have is this
person in here?
MR. O'CONNELL: Oh, I'm prepared to answer that. He's
just wondering (inaudible) the information.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, the evidence obtained, Ms.
Martinez Cruse.

I'm curious about that.

THE COURT: I'm afraid I would not have any
information to give you on that.
MR. O'CONNELL:

And I probably don't either. It

really has no effect on the plea (inaudible).

19

THE COURT: Right. Mr. Kilicher, you are pleading to

20

two counts, each of which could carry penalties of up to five

21

years in prison and fines of $5,000 plus an 85 percent

22

surcharge and those could be run consecutive to each and

23

cumulative in terms of the fines.

Do you understand?

24

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

25

THE COURT: By your plea you would be admitting that

1

on or about May 27 of 2003 at 5575 South 900 East in Salt Lake

2

County, you obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the

3

property of Pizza Hut with the purpose of depriving the owner

4

of the value of that property; that the value of that property

5

was a thousand, between a thousand and $5,000.

6

on or about that same date and location you entered or remained

7

unlawfully in the building of another with intent to commit a

8

theft.

9
10

THE DEFENDANT: I don't know about that, I didn't
enter the building.

11
12

And also that

MR. O'CONNELL: Just a second. He wasn't the one that
actually entered.

He assisted another who he drove -

13

THE COURT: Okay, so that charge is as a party.

14

MR. O'CONNELL: As a party.

15

THE COURT: Party liability.

Do you understand that

16

if you aided and abetted and assisted in that then you are

17

charged with the same.

18
19

Oh, yes, this was you and your buddies.

You are the

one that is living with - is it Mr. Bradford?

20

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

21

THE COURT: Mr. Kilicher, have you had enough time to

22

discuss this matter with your attorney?

23

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

24

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice you

25

received?

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT: Are you being forced in any way into this

3

Yes.

plea?

4

THE DEFENDANT: No.

5

THE COURT: Has anything else been promised to you? I

6

mean you've already received a substantial reduction through

7

the amendment.

8

THE DEFENDANT: No.

9

THE COURT: Are you today under the influence of

10

anything that would affect your ability to enter this plea?

11

THE DEFENDANT: No.

12

THE COURT: Then how do you plead to this count -

13

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

14

THE COURT: - these two counts theft and burglary?

15

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty on all.

16

THE COURT: If you would go ahead and sign.

17

Alright, Mr. Kilicher, I'm going to accept your plea

18

as a knowing and voluntary plea.

If you would go ahead and

19

sign the form if you haven't already.

Oh, you did.

20

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

21

THE COURT: Never mind, I'm signing it.

22

did.

23

to withdraw the plea.

Of course you

You have until the day of sentencing as the maximum time

24

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

25

THE COURT: You would have to give me a good reason in

1

writxng on why you would want me to withdraw the plea.

2

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

3

THE COURT: All right.

4
5

sentence report.
And I'm going to need to have him waive the time

6

because of the holidays.

7

MR. O'CONNELL:

8
9

We'll refer you for a pre-

That's fine, Your Honor. That would

be our preference too.
THE COURT: We'll set this for January 7th.

You'll

10

have to report to AP&P within the next two or three business

11

days and I'll see you on the 7th.

12

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Addendum "D"
Court of Appeals Order Withdrawing Sua Sponte Motion to Dismiss

UTAHAPPLu^.;.
JUL 0 5 2005
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 20050406-CA
v.
Vidar Kilicer,
Defendant and Appellant,

This matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion for
summary disposition.1
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sua sponte motion for summary
disposition is withdrawn, and a ruling on the issues raised
therein is deferred pending plenary presentation and
consideration of the case. See Utah R. App. P. 10.
Dated this _5L day of July, 2005.
FOR THE COURT:

f

T0figBP3>~-\^

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

1. Kilicer also filed a motion to file an overlength memorandum.
That motion is resolved through this order and the entire
memorandum was considered.

Addendum "E"
Affidavit of Hakeem Ishola filed with Response to Sua Sponte Motion to
Dismiss

Hakeem Ishola, Utah State Bar #5970
ISHOLA LAW FIRM, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
716 East 4500 South, Suite N142
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 269-9541
Facsimile: (801)269-9581
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF HAKEEM ISHOLA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
:
VIDAR KILICER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Lower Court No. 041904765
Ct. App. No. 20050406-CA

:

Hakeem Ishola, under the penalty of perjury as provided in relevant United States Codes,
deposes and states as follow:
1. I am a licensed attorney in Texas and Utah, and I am also licensed before the United
States Supreme Court, and several United States District Courts and United States Courts of Appeal.
2. I have practiced criminal and immigration law since 1991. I have appeared in numerous
criminal matters in federal/state courts and immigration courts Nationwide. I have appeared before
United States District Courts and Court of Appeals throughout the Nation. I have litigated before
the United States Supreme Court. I have successfully by myself or with other attorneys represented
clients on serious criminal and deportation matters, including death penalty matters. I have lectured
on criminal-immigration law, and have published numerous articles on criminal-immigration law,
such as Of Confrontation: The Right Not to be Convicted on the Hearsay Declarations of an

Accomplice (1990 Utah Law Review); Of Conviction and Removal: the Impact of New Immigration
Law on Criminal Aliens (Utah Bar Journal 1997); INS v. St. Cyr: Supreme Court and Draconian
Criminal Immigration Law (Utah Bar Journal 2001); Representing Detained Aliens, to be published
in Annual AILA Handbook (Summer 2005). I will be lecturing over 3000 immigration lawyers at
the annual AILA summit to be held in Salt Lake City, Utah, this summer.
3. Some of my most recent successful, published, precedent-setting court cases include INS
v. Galvez-Letona (10th Cir. 2001); INS v. Insixignmy (District Court, Utah, 2000); State v. MohU 901
P.2d 991,1009 (Utah 1995); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App. 203 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Raul
Cruz-Garza v. AshcrofU
4.

, Case No. 04-9508 (10th Cir., 2/2/2005).

P.3d _ , 2005 WL

It has been my experience that most immigrants are not aware of the deportation

consequences of their guilty pleas until they receive a detainer from the DHS and a notice to appear
indicating commencement of deportation proceedings. I have inherited hundreds of cases from
criminal defense lawyers in Utah and Texas where non-citizens were advised to plead guilty to
clearly deportable offenses because the criminal defense lawyers are not current on the state of
immigration laws. This is particularly true when the non-citizen is told he or she would only serve
30 days in jail or less and will be released by the criminal court. Most non-citizens, in my
experience, are not aware of what crimes constitute an "aggravated felony" under federal law. Nor
are most criminal defense lawyers aware that certain misdemeanors and felonies under state law may
constitute an aggravate felony for federal immigration law purposes. Even the most seasoned
criminal defense attorneys in Utah, who will take the time to consult an immigration lawyer before
advising their clients to plead to certain minor offenses, are always baffled about what crimes
constitute an "aggravate felony."
2

5. It has also been my experience that when an aline files an appeal of right to an appellate
court, DHS will not initiate proceedings while the appeal is pending. However, if an alien files a
post-conviction petition for relief, DHS treats such a petition as collateral proceeding and will initiate
removal proceedings.
6. Further the affiant sayeth naught
DATED this 14th day of June, 2005.

Hakeem Ishola \
Affiant

3

Addendum "F"
Relevant Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules
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United States Code Annotated Currentness
Constitution of the United States
*li Annotated
•* Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital
Crimes; Double Jeopardy; Self-incrimination; Due Process
of Law; Just Compensation for Property (Refs & Annos)
Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes;
Double Jeopardy; Self-incrimination; Due JProcess.of Law;
Just Compensation for Property

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

<This amendment is further displayed in five separate
documents according to subject matter,>

<see USCA Const Amend. V-Capital Crimes>

<see USCA Const Amend. V-Double Jeopardy>

<see USCA Const Amend. V-Self Incrimination>

<see USCA Const Amend. V-Due Process>

<see USCA Const Amend. V-Just Compensation>

Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes
J j , Print Doc ] f j | |
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Effective: [See Text Amendments]
United States Code Annotated Currentness
Constitution of the United States
*m Annotated
-* Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos)
2% Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.
Effective: [See Text Amendments]
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions
for subdivisions XXI through XXIX are contained in this document. For text of section, historical notes,
and references, see first document for Amendment VI. For additional Notes of Decisions, see documents
for Amend. VI, ante and post.>
Effective: [See Text Amendments]
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions
for subdivisions XXX through XXXIII are contained in this document. For text of section, historical
notes, and references, see first document for Amendment VI. For additional Notes of Decisions, see
documents for Amend. VI, ante and post.>
Current through P.L. 109-52 (excluding P.L. 109-42, 109-43) approved 08-02-05
END OF DOCUMENT
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Find citation:
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United States Code Annotated Currentness
Constitution of t h e United States
* l i Annotated
* i i A m e n d m e n t XIV. Citizenship; Privileges and
I m m u n i t i e s ; Due Process; Equal Protection; A p p o r t i o n m e n t
of Representation; Disqualification of Officers; Public D e b t ;
Enforcement
^AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES
A N D I M M U N I T I E S ; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL
P R O T E C T I O N ; A P P O I N T M E N T OF
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N ; D I S Q U A L I F I C A T I O N OF
O F F I C E R S ; P U B L I C DEBT; E N F O R C E M E N T
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• Citing Court Documents
Analysis
• Law Reviews
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• Treatises and Forms
Legislative History
• Editor's Notes
Statutes
• Cross References
Administrative
• Administrative Code
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S e c t i o n 1 . All persons born or naturalized in t h e United States,
and subject t o t h e jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of t h e United
States and of t h e State wherein t h e y reside. No State shall m a k e
or enforce any law which shall abridge t h e privileges or
i m m u n i t i e s of citizens of the United S t a t e s ; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or p r o p e r t y , w i t h o u t due
process of law; nor deny to any person w i t h i n its j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e
equal protection of t h e laws.

S e c t i o n 2 . Representatives shall be a p p o r t i o n e d a m o n g t h e
several States according to their respective n u m b e r s , c o u n t i n g
t h e whole n u m b e r of persons in each S t a t e , excluding Indians
not t a x e d . But w h e n t h e right t o v o t e at any election for t h e
choice of electors for President and Vice President of t h e United
States, Representatives in Congress, t h e Executive and Judicial
officers of a S t a t e , or t h e m e m b e r s of t h e Legislature thereof, is
denied t o any of t h e male inhabitants of such S t a t e , being
t w e n t y - o n e years of age, and citizens of t h e United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation
m rebetti'on, or other
c r i m e , t h e basis of representation t h e r e i n shall be reduced in t h e
proportion which t h e n u m b e r of such male citizens shall bear t o
t h e whole n u m b e r of male citizens t w e n t y - o n e years of age in
such State.

S e c t i o n 3 . No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or m i l i t a r y , under the United States, or under any
JL Print Doc 1 ^

Doc 1 of 17 j

http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default. wl?rs=WLW5.08&cite=us+const+amend+xiv&fn=

8/17/7005

ipjj^

Westiaw

Research T r a i l

i

Help

W**'

f Result ListY

i Doc

Sign Off J

10th I

W e l c o m e | Find | KeyCite | Directory | Court Docs ^

J

CO f

Links for

U.C.A. 1 9 5 3 , Const- A r t . 1 , § 1 2

J UT
L CONST Art 1, § 12

« Full Screen List
Locate in Result

| Table of More

%SR/

IB

Sec 12 [Rights of accused persons]
Approx 127 pages

Find citation
U.C.A. 1 9 5 3 , Const. A r t
C Citing References
available

1 , § 12

KpyGfe

History
Citing References
Monitor With KeyCite Alert
••Full-Text Document
• Table of Contents
• Versions
• Section Outline
Cases
• Last 60 Days
• Notes of Decisions
• Additional Citing Cases
• Citing Court Documents
Analysis
• Law Reviews

West's Utah Code A n n o t a t e d Currentness
Constitution of Utah
^* i Article I. Declaration of Rights
yf
• • S e c . 1 2 . [ R i g h t s of a c c u s e d p e r s o n s ]

I n criminal prosecutions t h e accused shall have t h e right t o
appear and defend in person and by counsel, t o d e m a n d t h e
n a t u r e and cause of t h e accusation against h i m , to have a copy
thereof, t o testify in his own behalf, t o be c o n f r o n t e d by t h e
witnesses against h i m , t o have compulsory process t o c o m p e l
t h e attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, t o have a speedy
public trial by an impartial j u r y of t h e c o u n t y or district in w h i c h
t h e offense is alleged t o have been c o m m i t t e d , and t h e r i g h t t o
appeal in all cases. I n no instance shall any accused p e r s o n ,
before final j u d g m e n t , be compelled t o advance m o n e y or fees
t o secure t h e rights herein guaranteed The accused shall n o t be
compelled t o give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled t o testify against her h u s b a n d , nor a husband against
his w i f e , nor shall any person be twice p u t in j e o p a r d y for t h e
s a m e offense.
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Where t h e d e f e n d a n t is otherwise entitled t o a preliminary
e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e function of t h a t e x a m i n a t i o n is limited t o
d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r probable cause exists unless o t h e r w i s e
provided by s t a t u t e Nothing in this c o n s t i t u t i o n shall preclude
t h e use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by s t a t u t e or rule
in w h o l e or in p a r t at any preliminary e x a m i n a t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e
probable cause o r at a n y pretrial proceeding w i t h respect t o
release of t h e d e f e n d a n t if appropriate discovery is allowed as
defined by s t a t u t e or rule.

Laws 1994, S J.R. 6, 5 1 . adopted at election Nov 8 r 1 9 9 4 , eff
Jan 1 , 1995
CROSS REFERENCES
Rights of d e f e n d a n t , criminal p r o c e d u r e , see § 7 7 - 1 - 6 .
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U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 24

*

WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
-•Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
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(1) A plea of n o t g u i l t y m a y be w i t h d r a w n at a n y t i m e prior t o
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( 2 ) ( a ) A plea of g u i l t y or no contest m a y be w i t h d r a w n only
upon leave of t h e c o u r t and a showing t h a t it was not k n o w i n g l y
and v o l u n t a r i l y m a d e .

• Last 60 Days
• Notes of Decisions
• Additional Citing Cases
• Citing Court Documents
Analysis

• Law Reviews
• American Law Reports (ALR)
• Treatises and Forms
Legislative History
• Text Amendments
• Editor's Notes

(b) A request t o w i t h d r a w a plea of guilty or no c o n t e s t , except
for a plea held in abeyance, shall be m a d e by m o t i o n before
sentence is a n n o u n c e d . Sentence m a y not be a n n o u n c e d
unless t h e m o t i o n is denied. For a plea held in a b e y a n c e , a
m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w t h e plea shall be m a d e w i t h i n 30 days of
pleading g u i l t y or no contest.
(c) Any challenge t o a guilty plea not m a d e w i t h i n t h e t i m e
period specified in Subsection ( 2 ) ( b ) shall be p u r s u e d u n d e r
Title 7 8 , Chapter 3 5 a , Post-Conviction Remedies A c t , and Rule
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Laws 1980, c 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c 6 5 , § 1; Laws 1994, c 16,
§ 1; Laws 2 0 0 3 , c 2 9 0 , § 1, eff. May 5, 2 0 0 3 ; Laws 2 0 0 4 , c 9 0 ,
§ 9 1 , eff,._May__3, 2 0 0 4 .
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Laws 2 0 0 3 , c 2 9 0 , r e w r o t e this section t h a t f o r m e r l y p r o v i d e d :

• Cross References

West Key Nujnbers

" ( 1 ) A plea of not g u i l t y m a y be w i t h d r a w n at any t i m e prior t o
conviction.
" ( 2 ) ( a ) A plea of g u i l t y or no contest m a y be w i t h d r a w n only
upon good cause s h o w n and w i t h leave of t h e c o u r t .
"(b) A request t o w i t h d r a w a plea of g u i l t y or no contest is m a d e
by m o t i o n a n d shall be made w i t h i n 30 days after t h e e n t r y of
t h e plea.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
*ii Chapter 35A. Post-conviction Remedies Act
-• Part 1. General Provisions

(Refs & Annos)

§ 78-35a-101. Short title
This act shall be known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act."

§ 78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies
(1) This
chapter
establishes
a substantive
legal
remedy
for any person
who
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted
all
other
legal
remedies,
including
a direct
appeal
except
as
provided
in
Subsection
(2) . Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of a petition
are found m Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) This chapter does not apply to:
(a) habeas corpus
criminal offense;
(b) motions to
Procedure; or

petitions

correct

that

a sentence

do not

challenge

pursuant

a conviction

to Rule

22 (e) , Utah

or

sentence

Rules

of

for a

Criminal

(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.

§ 78-35a-103. A p p l i c a b i l i t y — E f f e c t

on petitions

Except for the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107, this
applies only to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1, 1996.

chapter

§ 78-35a-104. Grounds for relief--Retroactivity of rule
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district
court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;

was

imposed

m

violation
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(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was
an unlawful manner;

imposed

in

an

unlawful

manner,

or

probation

(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or

counsel

(e) newly discovered material evidence
the conviction or sentence, because:

requires

exists

that

in

was

revoked

violation

the

court

the
the

to

of

in

the

vacate

(I) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the
time of trial
or sentencing
or in time to
include the evidence
in
any
previously
filed
post-trial
motion
or post-conviction
proceeding,
and
the
evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable
diligence;
(II) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
( m )

the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and

( I V ) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received.
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of
Appeals
after
the petitioner's
conviction became
final
shall be governed
by
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity.

§ 78-35a-105. Burden of proof
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent
has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-35a-106, but
once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove
its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence.

§ 78-35a-106. Preclusion of

relief—Exception

(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
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(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction
relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) (c) , a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

§ 78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one
year after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the
following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over
the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari
is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry
of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of
certiorari is filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations.
(4) Sections 77-19-8, 78-12-35, and
established in this section.

§ 78-35a-108. Effect of granting

78-12-40

do

not

extend

the

limitations

period

relief—Notice

(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either:
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or

(b) vacate the original conviction
sentencing proceeding as appropriate.

or

sentence

and

order

a

new

trial

or
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(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be stayed
for five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice
to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial or
sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no action.
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time during
the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift the stay
and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner.
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence the
petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to arraignment,
trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be
necessary.

§ 78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may,
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis.
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be
appointed to represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining
following factors:

whether

(a) whether the petition
evidentiary hearing; and

to

appoint

contains

counsel,

factual

the

court

allegations

shall

that

will

consider

require

the

an

(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require
the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective
be the basis for relief m any subsequent post-conviction petition.

cannot

§ 78-35a-110. A p p e a l — J u r i s d i c t i o n
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition
post-conviction
relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant
Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3.

Current through end of 2005 First Special
END OF DOCUMENT

for
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C
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part VIII. Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings
*r*

-• RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and Venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the
district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms
provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the
wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or
witnesses.
(c) Contents of the Petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality
of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state:
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in
which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the
petitioner;
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief;
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been
reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the
results of the appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other
civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the
results of the prior proceeding; and
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous
post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the Petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition:
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C
case;
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of Authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in
the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the
petition.
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who
sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in
the normal course.
(g)(1) Summary Dismissal of Claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the
court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on
its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been
adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings
on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings
of fact or conclusions of law.
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and
attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition.
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the
requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown.
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the
petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service of Petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not
be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is
a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.
(i) Answer or Other Response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after
service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow,
the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and
shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus
time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner
may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered
by the court.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise
dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to
delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may:
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing.
(k) Presence of the Petitioner at Hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the
petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or
video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not
otherwise be present in court during the proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility
where the petitioner is confined.
(1) Discovery; Records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a
party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with
evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the
respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records.
(m) Orders; Stay.
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and
an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5
days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the
respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay
of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and the
court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be
necessary and proper.
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems
appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and
Sections 21-7-3 through 21-7- 4.7 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs.
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
[Adopted effective July 1, 1996.]
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs proceedings challenging a conviction or sentence,
regardless whether the claim relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, or a
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